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This article is a reading of Kierkegaard's 1847 discourses on "The Lillies of the 
Field and the Birds of the Air." In these discourses, I argue, Kierkegaard pursues 
the problem of the being of the human being—that is, engages a critique of the 
fundamental structures of human reality. I show, in particular, how Kierkegaard 
elaborates a critique of care or concern. The lily and the bird exist without 
concern. Without collapsing the difference between the being of the lily or bird 
and the human being, Kierkegaard elaborates a possibility of human existence 
that is not organized around the project—which is to say in terms of "care." 
Taking the lily of the field and the bird of the air as emblems of affirmation, he 
expresses human existence attuned to the superfluous or "whyless" character of 
reality. 
David Kangas is associate professor of philosophy at California State University, 
Stanislaus. He is the author of Kierkegaard's Instant and is working on a follow 
up volume entitled Errant Affirmations: On the  Philosophical Meaning of 
Kierkegaard's Religious Discourses. Additionally he works on Spinoza and 
medieval mysticism.  
 
 There are several New Testament texts that Kierkegaard showed a 
particular attraction to, texts he returned to on multiple occasions. One of those 
texts is from The Gospel of Matthew: “Consider the lilies of the field and the birds 
of the air.” Indeed Kierkegaard wrote two small books on this one passage, in 
1847 and 1850. I will focus on the 1847 discourses and argue that in these 
discourses Kierkegaard is centrally concerned with the problem of “being 
human.” We are encouraged “to be content with being human” (first discourse) to 
reflect upon “the glory of being human” (second discourse) and to consider the 
happiness that is promised to us in being human (third discourse). What it is to 
be human is at stake here.  
Indeed, what I would like to suggest is that across these discourses 
Kierkegaard succeeds in interrogating the being of the human being, that is, in 
raising an ontological problematic. Drawing upon a long tradition that originates 
in Paul (and that also includes Hegel) Kierkegaard names the being of the 
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human being by the term “spirit” (Aand). What is interesting, however, is that 
Kierkegaard clarifies the meaning of spirit by reference to that which is, 
apparently, not at all spirit: the lily of the field and the bird of the air. They are to 
instruct us in what it is to be human. There is a paradox here: the lily of the field 
and the bird of the air lack what might seem, from the standpoint of the idealist 
metaphysics of modernity, at least, to constitute the unique ontological structure 
of the human: consciousness or, more precisely, self-consciousness. From 
Descartes through the various permutations of Idealism—from Kant through 
Fichte and Hegel—the ontological specificity of the human being was understood 
in terms of the power to achieve and remain present to oneself, to present 
oneself before oneself, to represent oneself. This milieu of representation was 
considered a privileged domain of the real. Indeed, the milieu of representation 
was understood as that within which and upon the basis of which anything could 
become present at all. The gambit of idealist metaphysics was to justify self-
consciousness as the ground of the real. 
In these discourses on the lily of the field and the bird of the air 
Kierkegaard abruptly displaces this idealist problematic in order, as it were, to 
begin all over again. To grasp who we are, to come to terms with the being of our 
being, it is not adequate to retrace the ways and  powers of consciousness, of 
representation, to render the real present. We must consider the lily of the field 
and the bird of the air; we must look to that which has no interiority at all. The 
blooming lily, the bird in flight, show forth an ontological dimension of the human 
being that is not, and cannot be, grasped in the terms of an idealist metaphysics.   
What they show to us according to Kierkegaard, I will suggest, is a 
dimension of “whylessness” or, if one likes, “anarchy”—namely a dimension 
refractory to projects, reasons, principles, goals. The lily blooms because it 
blooms, without its blooming becoming a project; and the bird of the air “neither 
sows nor reaps nor gathers into barns,” it does not establish itself economically. 
According to these discourses the human being exists according to its deepest 
possibility, as spirit, only when it achieves a comportment in its existence 
isomorphic to the lily and the bird. Kierkegaard summarizes the whole trajectory 
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of these discourses as follows: “only when the human being, though he works 
and spins, is just like the lily, which does not work or spin, only when the human 
being, although he sows and reaps and gathers into barns, is just like the bird, 
which does not sow and reap and gather into barns, only then does he [exist 
according to his possibility as spirit]” (UDVS, 208; SV 11, 190).    
I will proceed by considering each discourse in turn. All together, the three 
discourses constitute the progressive deepening of a problematic.   
 
First Discourse: The Initial Critique of Care as an Ultimate Ontological 
Structure 
If these discourses involve a critical problematic directed against the metaphysics 
of representation, it is important to note that they engage this problematic in a 
concrete mode: namely, as a critique of concern or care (Sorg). The human 
being is, concretely, the being who is always already wrapped up in concerns—
first and foremost in the concern to procure the material conditions of existence, 
what in Danish is called Næringsorg (literally, the concern for nutriments and 
alimentation). Næringsorg is the most basic modality of Sorg. The lily of the field 
and the bird, however, exist without concern: and not just as a matter of fact, but 
for essential reasons. In terms of the being of the lily and the bird there is no 
possibility of forming concern. And why not? Because the lily and the bird belong 
wholly to the moment, to the Now, in such a total way that it cannot even be 
called a “Now.” They exist “without temporality’s foresight, unaware of time, in the 
moment” (UDVS, 172; SV 11). The birth of concern in the human being, 
therefore, is linked to the upsurge of a temporal consciousness. Only a being 
whose existence is constituted on the horizon of temporality can, in general, 
become concerned. Time consciousness consitutes the general conditions for 
the possibility of concern. 
The human being, unlike the lily and the bird, exists on the basis a power 
of temporal projection, what Kierkegaard calls Forsynlighedens Arbeiden—that 
is, to translate it literally, the work of anticipative foresight. This work, the 
primordial labor of the human being, involves the synthesis of three modalities of 
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time: past, present and future. Speaking of the man of concern Kierkegaard 
writes: “When on the basis of a past time he has filled his hoppers, and is 
therefore provisioned for the present time, then he takes care to sow again for 
the future harvest, so that he can again fill his hoppers for the future time. For 
this reason three words are used to indicate the labor of anticipative 
foresight…and the three words indicate the determination of time, which 
constitues the ground of anticipation (Forsynligheden)” (UDVS, 172; SV 11, 158, 
my translation). Forsynligheden, the power of consciousness to project a 
temporal horizon, the gathering together of past, present and future in a dilated 
present, constitutes the explicitly articulated foundation of concern. 
As an abrupt contrast to what appears fundamental to human reality, 
however, Kierkegaard says of the lily and the bird: they  “do not labor”—de 
arbeider ikke.  In context this means precisely that they do not engage in the 
labor of projecting time. They belong to the moment but do not constitute the 
moment. They exist purely in the moment without any temporal ecstasy and, for 
this exact reason, they exist outside of the structure of concern—not merely 
contingently, but essentially, that is, outside the very possibility of forming 
concerns. Only on the basis of a consciousness of time and therefore on the 
basis of the labor of consciousness involved in the formation of temporal 
ecstasies can one have a concern. Concern is conditioned, in terms of its 
possibility, by the constitution of a temporal consciousness: and the lily and the 
bird do not labor. 
Moreover, according to Kierkegaard the projection of time is in fact but 
one of the modalities of a more basic power: the power of representation 
(Forestillingen). Time consciousness arises only in and through the more general 
power of representation, something that belongs to and makes up the reality of 
consciousness. Human reality plays out, in fundamental and ineluctable ways, on 
the plane of representation. If the lily and the bird have no concern, this is 
because they do not exist within a horizon of temporality; and if they do not exist 
within a horizon of temporality, this is because they belong to the moment without 
having constituted the moment through their own labor, that is, through the 
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spontaneity of their own consciousness. The human being, however, exists on 
the basis of a strange aporia: the present moment, what seems always original, 
is in fact the outcome of a previous work: the present is in fact a recapturing of 
presence, thus a re-presenting. Thus the present has the quality of being, in 
some way, secondary or delayed. Without this gap or delay there could be no 
distance from the present and, thus, no possibility of constituting a dilated 
present that includes the past and the future. The whole plane of representation, 
the human plane, thus plays out at a certain essential remove from the real. The 
lily and the bird belong to the real without distance; not so the human being. 
Insofar as the human being exists on the basis of a power of 
representation and thus does not immediately belong to the real, another 
modality of its life—one that relates intimately to concern—becomes possible: 
what Kierkegaard calls “comparison” (Sammenligningen). Comparison, a power 
founded in representation, is a fecund source of concern. Kierkegaard says 
“Næringsorg comes into being by means of comparsion” (UDVS, 178; SV 11, 
164). And it does so in a double way: first, existing with one another, speaking 
and taking notice of each other, human beings fashion comparative terms within 
which to understand themselves. An essential possibility for human beings, one 
that does not pertain to the lily and the bird, is to “not be contented with being 
human,” that is, to exist on the basis of a represented lack. Kierkegaard explores 
the folly of a human life consumed by the sense of lack, in a humorous vein, by 
imagining a lily comparing itself (negatively) to a Crown Imperial flower and a wild 
wood dove comparing itself to a well-fed domesticated dove. In each case they 
are completely consumed by the sense of lack and, aiming to overcome lack, 
they perish: the lily becomes uprooted and the wood dove becomes the farmer’s 
dinner. If we smile at the lily and the bird in this case, Kierkegaard suggests, we 
are only smiling at our own folly; we are acknowledging our own entanglement in 
representations. 
In a deeper and more intimate way, however, comparison transpires in 
and through the consciousness of time: where the present acquires its meaning 
(or has its meaning evacuated) through a comparison with the future. In these 
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terms, concern arises as founded upon the “representation of need in the future” 
(Forestilling om Trang I Fremtiden). Kierkegaard writes: “comparison constitutes 
the ground of Næringsorg insofar as this latter does not express an actual, but a 
represented need” (UDVS, 179; SV 11, 165, my translation). The future arises 
through the projective power of consciousness and thus has the ontological 
status of a representation; the future has no actuality. And yet, through 
comparison, this represented reality is allowed to determine the reality of the 
present. It is there one finds the upsurge of concern and, in concern, the pealing 
apart of the human being from its own moment, its own reality, and thus its 
subjection to the vast world of lack. Again, the lily and the bird form the abrupt 
contrast: “How is it that the bird has no Næringsorg? For this reason: that it does 
not compare one day with another” (UDVS, 179; SV 11, 165, my translation).   
Against the representation of future lack, along with the concern it 
generates, human labor must dedicate itself to “storing up in barns,” that is, to 
stockpiling capital as a hedge against the future. Thus, the primary laboring of 
fashioning a consciousness of time constitutes the condition for what in the 
broader sense is called economic life. Human labor always already transpires in 
a domain of political economy where the value of labor and the value of 
commodities produced have the status of representations. Human life itself 
becomes predicated upon relations of comparison: comparing one day to the 
next, one person to another, one thing with another thing. None of the 
comparisons are ontologically founded, and yet—in terms of political economy—
they do constitute the very reality of human life. There is the rub, there is the 
bottomless source of concern. For Marx, there is the bottomless possibility of a 
disfigured social and human existence. 
The realm of concern, then, coincides in an interesting way with the realm 
of what Marx called “ideology:” that which is in essence representational comes 
to determine actuality. As Kierkegaard puts it, the central problem is the 
possibility of becoming self-ensnared in our own representations. Only the 
human being, who exists precisely on the plane of representation, can entrap 
itself. Thus Kierkegaard says that the concerned one has “entrapped himself in 
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the snare…in which only the free [human being] can ensnare himself: in 
representation” (UDVS, 175; SV 11, 162). It is something remarkable: we are 
able to ensnare ourselves in comparative categories and in temporal projections. 
All of the concerns of human beings have their origin in this possibility of self-
ensnarement. Things that are not real, things we present to ourselves as real—
abstract notions like “tomorrow” or “wages”—for human beings constitute the 
very domain of the real. Existing with one another, we speak, and in speaking we 
fashion comparative terms—abstract categories—within which we then 
understand ourselves. This world of concern is an inverted world: the 
represented becomes the most real and the most real can appear to us only in a 
figure—namely, in terms of the being of the lily and the bird. The passage back to 
reality for the human being, then, involves a movement beyond representation, a 
comportment in existence that does not rely upon projections that have their 
origin in our free spontaneity. In this, the lily of the field and the bird of the air can 
be our teachers. 
And yet, is there not a problem here? Is there not an ontological chasm 
between human reality, which exists always upon the basis of representation, 
and the lily and the bird, who do not? Does not this divide preclude any essential 
instruction? Are we lilies? Are we birds? 
Now, the first discourse, which we must remember is written in a comic 
mode, sends us out into the fields to look at the lily and the bird. Why out into the 
fields?  Precisely because “out there” human life is not organized by an economy 
founded in representation. “Out there” the lily blooms and the bird takes wing 
wholly in the instant itself, in the joyous upsurge of being, without fashioning any 
abstract, comparative terms within which to live. If we imagine the lily and the 
bird living in terms of comparative terms, living through representations of future 
lack, we smile. But if we smile, Kierkegaard suggests, we are only smiling at 
ourselves—smiling at our own comical conflation of the real and the 
representation of the real. The point of the first discourse, however, is only 
initially to open up the distinction between something like the real and the 
representational order. To pay attention to the lily and the bird allows, for the 
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person suffering concern, a momentary lifting of the reign of comparative terms 
and the burdens of temporality. Seeing the representational status of the terms in 
which we live, we are free of their tyranny. “Out there” we get what is called 
“perspective.” Yet this is only momentary. The human problem goes deeper and 
requires a deeper reflection. 
 
Second Discourse: Spirit as Capability 
The second discourse comes to grip with the fact that temporality, labor and 
comparison—in general, the whole order of representation—belongs essentially 
to the human condition. It seeks to clarify the ontological chasm that separates 
human reality from the joyous kingdom of being of the lily and the bird. Human 
reality is characterized by an essential ambiguity: to be capable of labor, capable 
of constituting a time consciousness, capable of representation, these constitute 
the “glory” of the human; nevertheless, such capability constitutes also the 
conditions for the possibility of a destitution, misery and illusion that are never 
found in the joyous kingdom of nature. The second discourse is dedicated to the 
clarification of this ambiguity. And here it becomes clear that the lily and the bird 
cannot, in the strictest sense, be our teachers. Nevertheless, we can still learn 
from the lily and the bird. 
What is important about the lily and the bird in the second discourse is 
that, in spite of their difference from the human, they are nevertheless, through a 
contrast, able to bring human beings to the contemplation of their own “glory.” 
Concretely, to be human is to be mired in the concerns and comparative 
categories that belong to temporal existence. In the concrete sense, the terms by 
which human beings affirm themselves are comparative and relative. And yet, 
according to Kierkegaard, this is where the lily and the bird can intervene in order 
to reorganize the human gaze upon itself. The second discourse begins by 
comparing concern to a fixed stare: “How could one better indicate how concern 
takes root in the soul than by saying that it is like the eye which stares. When the 
eye stares it gazes fixedly ahead of itself, seeing only one thing, though in fact 
not seeing anything, since as the scientist explains it sees its own seeing. But 
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then the physician says: move the eye” (UDVS, 184; SV 11, 169, my translation). 
In concern the gaze fixates upon the blank nothing of the future. Though it 
appears to be seeing something, in fact it is seeing only its own seeing. Concern, 
in other words, is a modality of self-consciousness. In concern the human being 
rotates upon himself, immersing himself in his own projections, even while 
seeming to look outward. The “cure” for this is to move the eye—that is, to 
reorient the quality of attention, to reorganize the gaze, and in such a way that 
there is an exit from self-consciousness. The lily and the bird, in their 
manifestness, serve as a catalyst for this movement. 
What the lily and the bird can do, in particular, is to bring the human being 
to what Kierkegaard calls that “first thought” (Første Tanken), that is, to an 
affirmation of itself that is naive, or non-comparative. The lily and the bird can 
provoke the human to see itself through itself, as a genuine phenomenon, in the 
original naivete of its reality, liberated from the accumulated ideas of what it is to 
be human. The lily and the bird can provoke what Husserl later called an “epoche 
of the natural attitude.” 
Take the lily, which is arrayed in a glorious raiment. Kierkegaard says of 
the lily: “it is said that the lily is arrayed, but this is not to be understood in such a 
way that the lily’s existence is one thing and the fact of having raiment is 
something different; no, its raiment is the being lily itself” (UDVS, 188; SV 11, 
173, my translation). The lily exhausts the whole plenitude of its being in 
manifesting itself; it is nothing other than its self-manifesting. Or, to put it 
differently, the lily is the blooming of the lily, something like a pure surface, an 
outside with no inside. The lily, to put it in the terms Kierkegaard uses, belongs 
entirely to the order of the visible. Its glory is a visible glory.   
Now, here is why we can learn from the lily: the lily can teach us what it 
means to look at a phenomenon. Having learned what it means to see from the 
show of the lily the human being can bring this same gaze upon himself—
namely, to regard his own being as clothing, as glorious raiment, as a 
phenomenon. Kierkegaard writes: “Being clothed means then being human—and 
so to be well-clothed” (UDVS, 188; SV 11, 173, my translation). The lily can 
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awaken us again, we who are burdened by concern and enmeshed in 
comparative categories, to that basic posture of wonder in which we pay 
attention only, as it were, to the outward show of the thing, to the immediate 
blazing forth of the thing as the thing it is. The profoundest gaze upon the lily is 
not the gaze of the scientist, interested for example in a comparative taxonomy of 
lilies. No, the profoundest gaze is one which sees in the lily nothing more than its 
raiment, nothing more than a surface to take delight in. The lily becomes an 
object of wonder, and wonder is the form of attention which lets a thing show 
itself as the thing it is.  
As we look at the lily, we might look at ourselves. For the human being 
too, our “raiment,” in other words the being of our being, is something that can 
manifest itself to our naïve gaze. In the biblical language Kierkegaard draws 
upon, this will say that the being of our being has the ontological status of an 
image—we are, namely, made in “the image of God.” If our being has the 
ontological status of an image, that means it belongs, like the being of the lily, to 
the order of the visible. Indeed, to speak of the glory of the human being is 
already to situate human beings with respect to the visible, since glory is a 
category of the visible, of the manifest. And yet, here is where Kierkegaard’s 
discourse takes a turn, where the phenomenology becomes radicalized. For the 
human being Kierkegaard finds its necessary to speak, paradoxically, of an 
“invisible glory.” He says: “To be spirit, that is the human being’s invisible glory”  
(UDVS, 193; SV 11, 177). The glory of the lily is a purely visible glory; the glory of 
the human an invisible one. Therefore, to affirm the human being in a naïve way, 
to remain in that “first thought” about the human, will be to affirm a dimension of 
invisibility as what essentially belongs to the human. And yet, paradoxically, this 
invisibility can itself become a phenomenon to the extent that the being of the 
human is an “image.” 
It is, on the one hand, the insignia of the human being’s ontological 
specificity as spirit that, in some way, the human being resembles God; a lily, by 
contrast, does not. And yet, on the other hand, Kierkegaard does something 
quite interesting with this traditional motif: if one is to speak of the human being 
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as an image of God, it is necessary to think about an image in a way entirely 
different than a representation. Generally an image, thought as a representation, 
is poor in being, a copy, a reflection, a lack; it acquires its reality from something 
external to it.  Kierkegaard writes: “When a person sees his image in the mirror of 
the ocean, he sees his own image, but the ocean is not his image, and when he 
departs the image disappears. The ocean is not the image and cannot keep the 
image. Why is this, except for the reason that the visible form by its very visibility 
is powerless” (UDVS, 192; SV 11, 176). That which is visible can manifest itself 
only in a medium other than itself. The visible image is for this reason emptied 
out of its own reality, characterized by essential lack. Human reality, however, 
does not belong to the plane of the visible, but rather the invisible. In other words, 
if we resemble God, it cannot be through any property of ourselves that belongs 
to the order of the visible.   
What Kierkegaard’s discourse invites us to do is to look at the entire 
dimension of human lack, the whole realm of human errancy, of concern, as 
expressive of the glory of the human being. For underneath the human being’s 
exposure to itself, underneath its forming of concern, underneath its 
establishment of representation as the domain of the real, there is the 
fundamental ontological power of the human being: being able (at kunne). Only 
the human being is capable of erring, capable of concern, capable of 
representation. This, its capability, is its glory. Capability, being-able as such, is 
our raiment, our invisible glory. So, for example: to live a life burdened by the 
concern over procuring the conditions of existence, a life consumed by labor 
aimed at protecting oneself against some represented future need, such a life is 
not a perfection. The lily and the bird are perfect in being free of concern and 
labor. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard says, the capability of having concern, the 
capability of labor, these are, thought purely as capabilities, perfections.     
But the dimension of capability, the dimension of spirit, is fundamentally 
invisible. How so? Kierkegaard asks: “How is it that concern is possible?” In other 
words, how are we capable of concern? He answers: “Only by the fact that the 
eternal and the temporal touch each other in a consciousness; or, more correctly, 
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that the human being has consciousness. In consciousness he is far, far above 
the instant, no bird flew so high up.” The lily and the bird belong so wholly to the 
instant, to the Now, that it cannot even be called a Now. They belong to a plane 
of pure presence. It is precisely because they inhabit this plane of presence that 
they have no capability and, to be precise, that they are unable to form any 
concern. The human being, the being who is capable, on the other hand, both 
inhabits the instant and also stands far, far above it. In other words, the human 
being is the being that is always already divided from itself, incapable of being at 
one with itself. Thus, human capability originates in this radical incapability, in 
this rift or fracture, this rupture from immediacy. The dimension of invisibility that 
constitutes the very glory of the human being, then, is its reference to this gap in 
presence. Not belonging to the plane of presence constitutes the conditioning 
possibility of the human being. 
Thus the glory of the human is caught sight of inversely through the 
possibility of suffering all the excesses of consciousness: for example, boredom 
and concern over the future. Even more deeply, human glory shines inversely in 
the possibility of extreme destitution and misery, as in the New Testament saying 
that the “son of man has no place to lay his head”—something that can never be 
said of the bird or the lily. Only the human being can really suffer this essential 
placelessness. Placelessness is not itself a perfection, of course, but the 
possibility of not belonging to place is a perfection, the very perfection of spirit. 
Only the human is able to lack place. The divine image constitutive of human 
reality is, again, essentially invisible. 
It is only through this originary rupture from the plane of presence, then, 
that the human being has capability at all. The divine image is invisible. Only 
through its not being at one with itself can the human being, in the strictest 
sense, become something. The human being, to put it precisely, is the being who 
is capable of becoming. However, the way Kierkegaard develops this problematic 
in this discourse is to say that the human being is the only being who is capable 
of worship: “in truth to be able to worship is the invisible glory of the human 
above all other creatures” (UDVS, 193; SV 11, 177).   
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The capability to “worship,” then, summarizes the very meaning of human 
capability and thus marks the distinction between the human and the lily and the 
bird. In the naivete of their being the lily and the bird are “atheist.” So what, then, 
is worship thought as a pure capability? Kierkegaard contrasts the Christian point 
of view to that of the Greeks. The Greeks, he says, saw the glory of the human 
being in the erect posture and in the gaze of the eye. In other words, the Greeks 
understood the being of the human being in the power of theoria, intellectual 
vision, and in the exercize of sovereignty. Standing above the elements, 
commanding them, ruling, constitutes Greek glory. For Kierkegaard, this was still 
to think of the human in terms of a visible glory—that is, in terms of a capability 
exercised wholly upon the plane of the visible. It does not come to terms, in other 
words, with the decisive, ontological dimension of the human being.   
To be exact, it does not grasp the nature of the becoming that is proper to 
the human being. Worship grasps this capability, this becoming. But the crux of 
worship is the following: “It is glorious to be arrayed like the lily; even more 
glorious to be the ruler who stands erect; but it is most glorious to be nothing 
through the act of worship” (UDVS, 193; SV 11, 177, my translation). Only the 
human being is the being who is capable of grasping his own nothingness, of 
entering into and assuming that nothingness. Becoming nothing is the way of 
human becoming. Only the human being can see and experience and consent to 
its own non-sovereignty, its inability to posit being or to posit itself in being. To 
worship, thought as a capability, thus turns around to become the capability of 
not being able. Worship signifies the human capacity to see its capability as 
something for which it is not capable. Thus, returning to the lily and to the 
reorganization of the gaze, Kierkegaard writes: “if a human being is going to 
compare himself to the lily, he has to say: All that I am by being a human being—
that is my clothing; none of it is owing to myself, and yet it is glorious”  (UDVS, 
192; SV 11, 176). Capability is indeed the human being’s own capability; and yet 
the human does not, as Fichte would have it, posit itself as capable. 
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Third Discourse: Decision as Radical Capability 
According to the second discourse the glory of the human being lies in its 
capabilities. In the third discourse Kierkegaard tries to clarify a further element of 
capability, that of choice or decision. Being able to choose constitutes the glory of 
the human and separates the human from the lily and the bird, whose existence 
plays out on a plane of necessity. And as Kierkegaard will say, the only real 
choice is the choice between “God” and “mammon.” We shall have to see what 
this choice means. 
In the third discourse there is a definite shift of focus. Kierkegaard 
considers the being of the lily and the being of the bird with respect to what might 
be called the general economy of nature. In the order of nature, life and death 
are tragically conjoined, to the point of identity. The death of one thing is already 
the beginning of something else, the making room for, enabling, fertilizing some 
other thing. Life and death are so inseparably joined in nature that it becomes 
impossible to say what power is actually manifest in nature. Of the blooming lily, 
Kierkegaard asks, with the full pathos of a lacuna: “is it life or is it death?” When 
a lily blooms in all its splendor, he continues, is this “the life which, eternally 
young, renews itself, or is it the corruption which treacherously conceals itself?” 
(UDVS, 203; SV 11, 185). What power is it, exactly, that manifests itself in the 
blooming of the lily? Is it life or death? Is it natality or mortality? Can one even 
answer this question?  Is it even intelligible to speak of a difference?   
The impossibility of any resolution to this question, of any disjoining of life 
and death, is what Kierkegaard calls the “corruptibility” of nature. All things, 
human and inhuman, are subject to corruption. However, there is already 
something different happening in the human: it is the human being who is 
capable of asking “is it life or is it death?” At the site of the human, the site of 
spirit, things do not merely expend themselves, they are “recollected” in the 
fragility of a trace. The general economy of nature is, as it were, upset or 
suspended in recollection: things do not just pass, they linger. Last summer’s 
lilies, once in bloom but now no more (never more, as Poe would say), yet bloom 
still in recollection. This lingering of things prior to their annihilation is what 
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Kierkegaard calls Veemod, melancholy. Melancholy to this extent constitutes the 
very structure of consciousness; and it is as though melancholy were already the 
beginnings of something different, a different kind of blooming altogether. And 
indeed for Kierkegaard it is. 
Melancholy is the intensification of concern. Or rather, it is already a 
rupture of all the structures of concern inasmuch as it is the gripping of the 
human being by an essential indetermination. Melancholy constitutes the very 
resonance of the question: is it life or is it death? In melancholy the meaning of 
being becomes questionable and so calls forth, according to Kierkegaard, a 
fundamental decision, a choice. And here we gain a sense of the specific 
meaning of the capability of the human, that which constitutes its invisible glory: 
the capability for a radical decision. The lily of the field and the bird of the air play 
out their whole being, Kierkegaard says, on a plane of necessity, without choice. 
The human being is the being who must decide concerning the meaning of its 
being. Melancholy is the crisis which calls forth a decision. 
So what sort of decision is at issue here? Kierkegaard formulates the 
terms of this choice by drawing upon the language of the New Testament: it is a 
choice between “God” and “mammon.” He writes: “The human being must 
choose between God and Mammon. This is the eternal, unalterable condition of 
choice” (UDVS, 207; SV 11, 189).  The lily and the bird do not possess this 
capability of choice; it is the glory of the human. However, it is necessary to ask, 
what is this choice between God and mammon? Why is it that Kierkegaard 
formulates the question of the meaning of being as a choice between God and 
mammon? Is this not arbitrary? And, just to make explicit an issue that might 
arise, does not this appeal to God involve precisely an abandonment of the 
question of being? Does Kierkegaard not explicitly adopt a mode of thinking that 
must be called ontotheological, namely, a thinking that tries to secure the 
meaning of being by representing the highest instance of being (namely, God) as 
the ground of being and reason for being? Aren’t we dealing with the terrain of 
representations on literally the highest level? Though Kierkegaard without a 
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doubt inherits a certain discourse on God, what is necessary is to examine the 
text itself. 
First of all, the choice between God and mammon is not a choice between 
one thing and another thing. God is not present to the choice simply as an object 
of choice, but rather as the very condition of choosing. Kierkegaard says: “God’s 
presence in the choice [is what] posits the choice—between God and mammon” 
(UDVS, 207; SV 11, 189, my translation). One could say that, more basically 
than some thing chosen, God constitutes for Kierkegaard this persistent 
structural possibility of choosing. God is the name for the rift which involves the 
human being in a choice concerning the meaning of its being. In addition, to 
choose God is not to choose some ultimate object, but rather to choose a certain 
way of being. This is why one is dealing here with what might be called a 
fundamental choice, a choice that bears upon how I will be in each moment. By 
the very nature of such a choice it is something that is chosen “first.” Or, in the 
biblical language Kierkegaard appeals to, it is necessary to “seek first the 
kingdom of God.” Kierkegaard underscores the originary nature of the choice. 
So, God/mammon, the choice of the world, or of the kingdom of God, 
these are the terms of a radical choice, where the being of the human being is at 
stake, which is to say its most basic comportment. To choose first the kingdom of 
God is the New Testament name for this comportment. So again, what is it to 
choose God?   
Over several pages Kierkegaard works out a series of substitutions on the 
name “God,” which I summarize as follows: to choose God, he says, means to 
choose "the kingdom of God;” and to choose the kingdom of God means to 
choose the justice that belongs to this kingdom, God’s “righteousness;” and to 
chose the justice that belongs to this kingdom is to chose, Kierkegaard says, to 
“remain in one’s place” (bliver paa Stedet). Kierkegaard writes: “while then the 
visible world is destroyed and sinks in corruption, then you still remain in your 
place, and the beginning is first to seek the kingdom of God.” He continues: “but 
if it is true that the whole visible world is to sink in corruption, then the human 
being has no other point to which he can flee, and precisely for that reason he 
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remains at that place” (UDVS, 211; SV 11, 193, my translation). At what place? 
At the place where the human belongs in the totality of its being to the 
corruptibility of all things.   
Consequently, to choose God, to seek God’s kingdom first, signifies for 
the human being to consent to its place, that is, to its belonging to the order of 
total corruptibility, to consent with absolutely no reservations. The lily of the field 
and the bird of the air remain ever “in place.” Even the bird, though in constant 
movement, never really moves since it never moves outside its own “Now.” Only 
the human being can move, can become, and to become means precisely here 
to become finite, to assume or take on corruptibility as a condition. Only the 
human being can actually enter into its own finitude. To assume the condition of 
finitude, to remain in place, is simultaneously to open oneself to the gratuity of 
life. It is to learn to see life itself as what has the structure of a “remainder”—
Kierkegaard uses the Danish word “det Øvrige”—namely as excess, as what 
overflows beyond any necessity. The being of the human being, then, is that site 
in being where the gratuity of being can be marked. This is the meaning of spirit. 
 
Concluding Preface: Becoming a Lily 
In conclusion I want to return to the question of how the human being can, 
in its own way, become lily-like and bird-like. As Kierkegaard said: “only when the 
human being, though he toils and spins, is absolutely like the lily, which does not 
toil and spin; only when the human being, although he sows and reaps and 
gathers into barns, is absolutely like the bird, which does not sow and reap and 
gather into barns, only then does he not serve mammon.” To serve mammon is 
to organize one’s existence around the project, which is to say in terms of final 
ends and on the basis of future possibilities which originate in the 
representational power of consciousness. Serving mammon only has a sense 
within a horizon constituted by concern.   
The movement of Kierkegaard’s discourses, however, have disclosed a 
dimension of capability that is prior to that of concern. And then again, going 
even further, have disclosed a dimension of radical incapability underneath 
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capability as its conditioning possibility (no one gives capability to themselves). 
Finally, they have pointed to an expression of this capability—decision—which no 
longer has anything like the project about it. To choose the justice that belongs to 
the kingdom of God is to remain at, or enter into, one’s place. This is justice as 
adjustment, as a being situated. It is entering into one’s own site, one’s own 
givenness. Nothing is produced in this labor; it is labor as expenditure, without 
finality—and to this extent, it passes over from labor, organized around ends, into 
something like growth (lily) or flight (bird).   
In conclusion let us ask: what kind of existence is this? How is it that a 
human being can achieve a comportment that is lily-like and bird-like? What 
would it mean to exist no longer on the basis of concern, without project? What 
would a relation to the real be that is unmediated by representation? Actually, 
these have been persistent questions in the western tradition, or at least within a 
certain stratum of that tradition. To be specific, Kierkegaard’s discourses must 
finally be understood in terms of a problematic inaugurated by Marguerite Porete 
and Meister Eckhart, according to which only that which lives “without a why” 
truly lives.1 This tradition reemerges with great force, even if in a transformed 
way, in the later thought of Heidegger.2
In order to sketch the direction of such a thought, and without being able 
to address Kierkegaard’s relations to these thinkers here, it would be most 
appropriate to turn to the preface to What We Learn from the Lilies of the Field 
and the Birds of the Air. The preface opens a path, not only of reading, but also 
already of existence. Kierkegaard writes: “Although this little book is without the 
authority of the teacher, [is] a superfluity, insignificant, like the lily and the bird—
Oh, if only it were so!—it nevertheless hopes that by finding the only thing it 
seeks, a good place, it finds the significance of appropriation for that singular one 
whom I, with gladness and gratitude, call my reader” (UDVS, 157; SV 11, 145, 
my translation).   
Already contained in this preface is a certain circularity that relates to the 
reading of the text: the book is to guide human beings into a comportment that is 
lily-like and bird-like, and yet it can only be read appropriately—that is, in such a 
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way as to allow it to find its place—on condition that one is already able to grasp 
lily-being and bird-being. But this means already having become lily-like and bird-
like. The book presupposes in the reader, in other words, the very comportment 
to which it wants to lead the reader. It presupposes that the reader is already 
capable of grasping the significance of that which has no significance, of that 
which in its very being is superfluous. The book itself, ontologically, is a bird, a 
lily; and it arises out of a posture that is lily-like and bird-like. Therefore it can only 
be read appropriately—which means here appropriatively—out of a prior 
sensitivity to the superfluous and insignificant. In other words, the very structure 
of the book presupposes that there is something already within the existence of 
the reader that is receptive to that which overflows economies of meaning and 
acting-for-ends. So it is not really a question of “how to become a lily or a bird;” 
rather, it is about allowing this dimension of anarchy, what already structures life 
prior to and after the mediations of self-consciousness, greater place.  
                                                
1 This phrase occurs for the first time explicitly in the writings of Marguerite 
Porete.  See her The Mirror of Simple Souls, translated by Ellen Babinsky (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1993), chs. 89, 93, 134, 135. Meister Eckhart mostly likely 
inherited the phrase from Porete. See Michael Sell’s analysis of the relation 
between Eckhart and Porete in his The Mystical Languages of Unsaying 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 80ff. 
 
2 In his 1950 lectures, Der Satz vom Grund, Heidegger too turned toward a 
flower—the rose—in order to displace, fracture, and begin to delimit the seeming 
hegemony of the principle of reason as formulated by Leibniz, according to which 
“nothing is without a why.” In contrast to this, Heidegger bluntly confronts Leibniz’ 
mighty principle with a verse from the religious poet Angelus Silesius, who 
directly inherits the Eckhartian tradition, according to whom “the rose is without 
why; it blooms because it blooms.” And for Heidegger what is ultimately at stake 
in Silesius’ poem, and thus in the Eckhartian tradition, is the possibility of another 
kind of comportment for the human being, one falling outside the activity of 
rendering reasons. He writes: “What is unsaid [in Silesius’ fragment]—and 
everything depends on this—[is that] humans, in the concealed grounds of their 
essential being, first truly are when in their own way they are like the rose—
without why” (38). Heidegger immediately adds “we cannot pursue this thought 
any further here.” However, what finally has no Why, for Heidegger, is not, in the 
first instance, the human being, as for Eckhart or Kierkegaard—rather, it is being 
itself, being as physis or origination, being as the ever-recurrent opening of the 
play-spaces of being.  Being plays the way a child plays: without why, without 
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goal or purpose, outside the project structure, without telos. On the differences 
between Eckhart and Heidegger on this point, see Reiner Schürmann’s 
Wandering Joy (Lindisfarne Books, 2001), pp. 204 ff. 
